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Background: Many health systems in Africa are funded primarily through out-of-pocket payments. Out-of-pocket
payments prevent people from seeking care, can result to catastrophic health spending and lead to
impoverishment. This paper estimates the burden of out-of-pocket payments in Kenya; the incidence and intensity
of catastrophic health care expenditure and the effect of health spending on national poverty estimates.
Methods: Data were drawn from a nationally representative health expenditure and utilization survey (n = 8414)
conducted in 2007. The survey provided detailed information on out-of-pocket payments and consumption
expenditure. Standard data analytical techniques were applied to estimate the incidence and intensity of
catastrophic health expenditure. Various thresholds were applied to demonstrate the sensitivity of catastrophic
measures.
Results: Each year, Kenyan households spend over a tenth of their budget on health care payments. The burden of
out-of-pocket payments is highest among the poor. The poorest households spent a third of their resources on
health care payments each year compared to only 8% spent by the richest households. About 1.48 million Kenyans
are pushed below the national poverty line due to health care payments.
Conclusions: Kenyans are becoming poorer due to health care payments. The need to protect individuals from
health care related impoverishment calls for urgent reforms in the Kenyan health system. An important policy
question remains what health system reforms are needed in Kenya to ensure that financial risk protection for all is
achieved.Background
Protecting households from catastrophic health care
costs is a desirable objective of health systems worldwide.
The World Health Organization (WHO) call for univer-
sal health coverage emphasized the need to protect
households from catastrophic medical expenses and im-
poverishment arising from seeking health care [1]. The
call also urged health systems to ensure that health care
costs do not prevent people from receiving needed health
services [2]. Globally it estimated that 150 million people
suffer financial catastrophe each year due to health care
payments and about 100 million are pushed into poverty
because of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments [3].* Correspondence: jchuma@kilifi.kemri-wellcome.org
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumCatastrophic health care payments occur in both rich
and poor countries, but over 90% of the people affected
reside in low-income countries [4]. Catastrophic health
expenditure can occur regardless of the amount of
money paid to health care services. Rich households
might pay large medical bills without experiencing nega-
tive implications, while low levels of spending among
poor households can have severe financial implications
for livelihoods [4,5]. There is no single accepted defin-
ition of catastrophic spending. Some studies assess pay-
ments in relation to the budget share [6-8]; while others
argue that catastrophic spending should be measured in
relation to capacity to pay (i.e. household expenditure
net of food spending) [4,9,10]. Nonetheless, all measures
suggest that when households spend a large proportion
of their budget on health care, they often forego other
goods and services, which can have negative implications
for living standards [11].entral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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tries are predominantly funded through OOP payments.
Out-of-pocket payments do not offer any financial risk
protection; many households incur high health expend-
iture, while others are impoverished due to health care
costs [4]. A significant number of households do not
seek care because they cannot afford to pay [12]. House-
holds often adopt coping strategies to meet the costs
associated with seeking care [13]. These strategies, al-
though useful in the short-term, lead to impoverishment
or deepen poverty among households who are already
poor [5,6,14]. Such households are hardly captured in
national poverty estimates, since high health costs raise
their expenditure above the poverty threshold and are
therefore considered to be non-poor [15].
Various studies assess the impact of catastrophic
spending on household poverty. These studies, mainly
conducted in Asia and Latin America, show that health
care costs are major causes of impoverishment. In their
study on health expenditures in 11 Asian countries, van
Doorslaer et al. reported that poverty estimates were
14% higher when OOP payments are accounted for and
that about 78 million people are pushed into poverty
due to heath care costs [15]. Elsewhere, a survey of 89
countries found that catastrophic expenditure was
reported by 3%, 1.8% and 0.6% of households in low,
middle and high income countries respectively [3]. Few
studies have documented the levels of catastrophic
health expenditures in Africa. In Burkina Faso, about
15% of households reporting illness incurred costs
greater than 40% of their non-food consumption ex-
penditure [16], while in Uganda, 2.9% of households in-
curred catastrophic expenditure in 2003 [10]. In Nigeria,
40.2% of households incurred costs greater than 10% of
their consumption expenditure; this proportion reduced
to 14.8% when the threshold was set at 40% [17]. The
poorest households were more likely to incur cata-
strophic expenditures compared to households.
A limitation of the few studies conducted in Africa is
that they do not assess the implications of health care
costs on national poverty estimates [10,16-18]. Assessing
the role of health care payments on poverty is important
for informing policy on the need to incorporate health
financing designs in poverty reduction programmes and
for highlighting the urgent need to ensure that health fi-
nancing systems offer financial risk protection. This
paper contributes to the literature by assessing the ex-
tent of catastrophic health spending and impoverish-
ment in Kenya. Using different thresholds, which have
been widely applied in the literature, the paper estimates
the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health care
expenditure for both outpatient and inpatient care and
shows the proportion of individuals pushed into poverty




Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was
739 US Dollars in 2009. The proportion of Kenyans
living below the poverty line was 45.9% in 2005 [19],
although recent statistics suggests that these levels could
have increased to over 50% [20]. A description of the
Kenyan health financing and delivery system is published
elsewhere [21]. Briefly, all public health facilities charge
user fees at the point of care. In 2004, user fees at dis-
pensaries and health centres were replaced with a flat
consultation fee of Kenya shillings 10 (US$0.13) and 20
(US$0.26) respectively. There exists a significant private
sector that owns about 49% of all health facilities in the
country. The Kenyan health system relies heavily on
OOP payments, accounting for 51.1% of total health ex-
penditure in 2001; 39.3% in 2005 and 36.7% in 2009
[22,23].
Data sources
Data are from a nationally representative cross-sectional
household survey conducted by the Ministry of Health
in 2007. Detailed data were collected on socio-
demographic characteristics, self reported illnesses,
health care utilization patterns, OOP payments, sources
of funds and consumption expenditure for both food
and non-food items. Out-of-pocket spending were col-
lected for various items including registration, drugs,
consultation, diagnostic tests, surgery, daily bed rates
among others. Data were collected for both outpatient
and inpatient illnesses using a four week and one year
recall period respectively.
Data analysis
Measuring incidence and intensity of catastrophic spending
Standard approaches to assess the incidence and intensity
of catastrophic expenditure and the implications for
poverty estimates are described in detail by O’Donnell
et al. (2008). These analytical approaches are briefly
described here but interested readers are encouraged to
refer to O’Donnell et al. (2008) for additional information.
Briefly, estimating catastrophic expenditure requires
measuring the extent to which health costs exceed dif-
ferent thresholds of household income or consumption
expenditure. The incidence of catastrophic spending can
therefore be estimated from a fraction of a sample with
health care costs as a share of total (or non-food) ex-
penditure exceeding a certain threshold. There is no sin-
gle accepted threshold for catastrophic health care
payments. Often, the choice of the threshold is arbitrary
but two commonly used ones are 10% of total income or
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Alternative catastrophic thresholds are presented in this
study to demonstrate sensitivity of different measures.
Analysis is done purely on out-of-pocket payments (i.e.
payments made directly to providers), although it is
recognized that indirect costs affect households signifi-
cantly [5]. Where costs were fully covered through
health insurance, the same were excluded in the analysis
unless co-payments were made, in which case the co-
payment was considered as OOP payments. Households
were classified into socioeconomic quintiles using per
capita consumption expenditure.
The incidence of catastrophic payments is defined as
payments in excess of a threshold budget share. The
catastrophic head count (HC) refers to the percentage of
households incurring catastrophic payments and is esti-






Where N is the sample size: E is an indicator equal to
1 if OOP payments of a household i as a proportion of
its consumption expenditure (total or non-food) is
greater than the threshold and zero otherwise. The HC
estimates the proportion of households that have OOP
payments above the threshold but does not measure the
amount by which these payments exceed the chosen
threshold. The catastrophic payment overshoot is esti-
mated to give an indication of how much OOP pay-
ments exceed the threshold. The overshoot (O) is
estimated as follows [11]:
Oi ¼ Ei Ti=Xi  zð Þ ð2Þ
Where Ti is the OOP payments of household i, Xi is
the household consumption expenditure (food or non-
food) and z is the threshold budget share. Following this





The intensity of catastrophic expenditure is measured
by the payment in excess of the threshold, averaged over
all households exceeding that threshold. This measure,




ð4ÞAdjusting catastrophic spending estimates for socio-
economic status
A limitation of the head count and overshoot discussed
in the previous section is that they do not differentiate
between poor and rich households [11]. The headcount
(HC) for example counts all households whose levels of
OOP payments exceed a certain threshold equally. The
overshoot (O) counts the payments in excess of the
threshold equally, irrespective of whether these pay-
ments are made by poor or rich households [11]. High
levels of OOP payments among rich households can be
met through reducing spending on non-basic items like
entertainment, while for poor households, even low
levels of spending might require foregoing basic needs
like food and education. Clearly, the opportunity costs of
catastrophic health care payments will differ between
rich and poor households.
To account for differences in the distribution of cata-
strophic payments between rich and poor households,
results are presented for weighted and un-weighted head
counts and overshoot. The distribution of catastrophic
payments in relation to household welfare is measured
by the concentration indices for Ei (CE) and Oi (Co). The
concentration index ranges from −1 to +1. It is negative
(positive) if the variable of interest is concentrated
among the poor (rich) [24]. For example, a positive value
of CE indicates a greater tendency for the richer house-
holds to exceed the payment threshold, while a negative
value indicates that the poor are more likely to exceed
the threshold. The distribution of the head count and
overshoot can be adjusted for socio-economic differ-
ences by putting into consideration the concentration
indices CE and CO [25]. The weighted head count (HC
w)
and overshoot (Ow) measures are computed as:
HCw ¼ HC 1 CEð Þ;OwO 1 COð Þ:
Where normative interpretation of catastrophic pay-
ments are necessary, it is considered appropriate to give
more weight to excess payments made by poorer house-
holds [26]. The weighted head count (HCw) gives a
weight of two to the lowest consumption expenditure
(income) and the weight declines linearly with the rank
in socio-economic measure such that the richest house-
holds receive a weight of zero [11].
Health care spending and impoverishment
National and international poverty estimates usually do
not take into account OOP payments for health care.
The implication of OOP payments on poverty estimates
are estimated by calculating poverty levels using con-
sumption expenditure before making health care pay-
ments (i.e. gross of OOP payments) and after paying for
health care (i.e. net OOP payments) [7]. Three measures
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the proportion of households living below the poverty
line; (2) Poverty gap, referring to the aggregate of all
shortfalls from the poverty line (i.e. the poverty head
count multiplied by the average deficit of the poor from
the poverty line); (3) Normalised poverty gap, which is
obtained by dividing the poverty gap by the poverty line.
The normalized poverty gap is useful for international
comparisons across countries with different poverty lines
and currency units [11]. These measurements require
setting a poverty line and assessing the extent to which
health care payments push households below the pov-
erty line. The national poverty line of Kenya shillings
(KES) 1257 per person per month was used to estimate
poverty levels before and after health care payments.
This poverty line has been criticized as being too low to
meet the high costs of living [20], but remains the offi-
cial rate used by the Kenyan government to estimate
poverty levels and thus provides a good basis for
comparisons.
Data were analyzed using STATA (Version 11.2) and
ADEPT (version 4.1). Ethical clearance was sought from
the Kenya Medical Research Institute (protocol number
1609).
Results
Out-of-pocket payments on outpatient and inpatient
services
A total of 8,414 households took part in the cross-
sectional survey. Illnesses in the four weeks preceding
the survey were reported by 52.9% of households
(Table 1). Hospital admissions were reported by 9.3% of
households. About 3% of illnesses reported in the four
weeks preceding the survey were not treated and 125
individuals (11.5%) requiring hospital admission were
not admitted due to cash shortages. The concentration
indices (CI) show that the richest households were more
likely to report illnesses (CI = 0.01 for outpatient ill-
nesses; 0.098 for inpatient), however these differences
were only significant for inpatient care (p < 0.001).Table 1 Proportion of survey households reporting illness
Outpatient (n = 4449) Inpatient (n = 784)
Quintiles
1 840 (18.9) 120 (15.3)
2 871 (19.6) 128 (16.3)
3 936 (21.0) 156 (19.9)
4 927 (20.8) 196 (25.0)
5 875 (19.7) 184 (23.5)
Concentration Index 0.01 0.098
Urban 1376 (30.9) 296 (37.8)
Rural 3073 (69.1) 488 (62.2)Differences between rural and urban areas were also
only significant for hospital admissions (p < 0.001).
Mean annual spending for all households regardless of
whether they reported illness was KES 3526.7 for out-
patient services and KES 8195.5 for hospital admissions
(Table 2). Rich households spent significantly more
money on health care than the poor (P < 0.001). For ex-
ample, the poorest households spent a mean of KES
2217 on outpatient services, while the richest house-
holds spent KES 5345.9 (P < 0.001). Mean spending on
outpatient services was significantly higher in urban than
in rural areas (Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the household budget share of OOP
payments among households reporting illness. Overall
households spent 5.2% of their annual budget on out-
patient services and 2.0% on inpatient services. Mean
total OOP payments amounted to 7.3% of households’
annual budget. The poorest households spent the largest
share of their budget on health care (15.3%) compared
to the richest households (3.3%). For outpatient services,
the poorest quintile spent 10.0% of their budget on out-
patient care, while the richest spent 2.5%. Hospital
admissions consumed a lower share of household budget
compared to outpatient care, with the poorest quintile
spending about 5.6% of their budget on inpatient care,
while the richest quintile spent 0.8%. Rural households
spent a larger proportion of their annual budgets on
health care compared to urban households (7.8% and
5.7% respectively).
Catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment
The incidence and intensity of catastrophic health pay-
ments are shown on Table 3. Results show an inverse re-
lationship between catastrophic headcount and the
various thresholds. For example, 15.5% of households
reported total OOP payments exceeding 10% of total
household expenditure. Increasing the threshold to 40%
reduces the catastrophic head count to 4.6%. The inci-
dence of catastrophic health expenditure increases when
catastrophic payments are defined in respect to non-
food budget. For instance, the proportion of household’s
incurring total OOP payments greater than 25%
increases from 6.9% to 16.0% when estimates are based
on total and non-food expenditure respectively. The
results also show that a larger proportion of households
reporting illness in the four weeks preceding the survey
(outpatient) incurred catastrophic expenditure compared
to inpatient. For example, 4.4% of households reporting
outpatient illnesses incurred costs above 25% of their
total expenditure compared to 2.0% of households who
reported a hospitalization.
The weighted head count is higher than the un-
weighted meaning that those who exceed the payment
threshold tend to be poorer (Table 3). For example, the















1 2217.0 3587.6 991.8 8388.8 5354.9 7005.3
2 2298.4 3961.6 879.6 10470.2 3566.6 6364.2
3 3802.8 5863.4 947.4 6962.4 5556.3 7902.8
4 3971.1 5863.2 1528.4 11630.1 7296.0 10403.6
5 5345.9 11226.8 1981.3 15798.9 19209.1 30603.1
Concentration Index 0.179 0.229 0.171 0.13 0.316 0.329
Urban 5290.3 9625.9 1520.6 12326.5 16113.2 27414.8
Rural 2959.4 5483.9 1183.6 11211.4 5648.6 9355.8
All 3526.7 6506.0 1265.6 11516.0 8195.5 13813.0
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above 10% of their total expenditure is 15.5%. This pro-
portion increases to 17.6% after applying weights to dif-
ferent socio-economic groups. Similarly, the proportion
of households reporting total OOP payments above 40%
of non-food spending is 11.4%. Accounting for differ-
ences in socio-economic status through the weighted
head count increases this proportion to 14.8%. The
weighted overshoot level presents a similar pattern for
all threshold levels (i.e. they are higher than the un-
weighted). The higher concentration of catastrophic pay-
ments among the poorest households is also confirmed
by the negative values of concentration indices for the
incidence of catastrophic payment (C_E). The C_E
increases with the threshold, suggesting greater inequal-
ities in catastrophic spending between the poorest and
richest households for higher thresholds. The mean
positive overshoot (i.e. the extent to which household
health payments exceed various thresholds) show that
















































Figure 1 Mean household budget share of out of pocket payments.higher than 40% of total budget share. The correspond-
ing value for non-food budget share is 25.4%.
The poverty head count before and after accounting for
OOP payments is shown in Table 4. The results reveal
that 54.9% of individuals were already living below the na-
tional poverty line before making any health care pay-
ments. After accounting for OOP payments, the poverty
head count increased by 2.7 percentage points. This
represents a substantial rise in the poverty estimates,
amounting to 5% of the population or 1.98 million indivi-
duals. The average deficit to reach the poverty line in the
population (i.e. the poverty gap) was KES 3938 before
accounting for OOP payments. After accounting for OOP
payments, the average deficit increased to KES 4952.
Discussion
The results presented in this paper show great disparities
in levels of self-reported illness and health care payment
between the poor and the rich. The richest households










Table 3 Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditure
% of total expenditure
Outpatient Inpatient Total OOP payments
10% 25% 40% 10% 25% 40% 10% 25% 40%
Head count (HC)
1 (Poorest) 18.1 8.2 6.1 6.9 4.4 3.6 23.0 11.3 8.7
2 10.8 4.3 2.4 4.2 2.2 2.1 15.6 7.1 4.5
3 10.7 4.6 2.7 2.6 1.2 0.6 12.9 6.3 4.0
4 9.2 2.5 1.4 4.3 1.3 0.8 14.2 4.7 3.1
5 (Richest) 7.5 2.4 0.9 3.1 0.7 0.4 11.9 4.9 2.9
Total 11.2 4.4 2.7 4.2 2.0 1.5 15.5 6.9 4.6
Weighted total head count 13.3 5.6 3.7 4.9 2.7 2.2 17.6 8.3 5.8
Overshoot
1 (Poorest) 20.0 18.4 17.5 3.5 2.9 2.5 34.5 32.3 31.0
2 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.0 6.2 4.6 3.8
3 2.9 1.9 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 4.7 3.3 2.6
4 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.2 3.9 2.6 2.0
5 (Richest) 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 6.2 5.0 4.5
Total 5.7 4.7 4.2 1.4 1.0 0.7 11.0 9.5 8.7
Weighted overshoot (Ow) 9.5 8.2 7.6 2.06 1.59 1.35 15.0 13.3 12.4
Concentration Index, C_E −0.184 −0.273 −0.382 −0.156 −0.385 −0.482 −0.137 −0.205 −0.257
Concentration Index, C_O −0.663 −0.765 −0.817 −0.467 −0.580 −0.642 −0.489 −0.543 −0.574
% of non food expenditure
Outpatient Inpatient Total OOP payments
10% 25% 40% 10% 25% 40% 10% 25% 40%
Head count
1 (Poorest) 35.6 22.3 17.0 10.9 9.7 9.3 39.7 26.6 21.1
2 23.0 13.9 9.4 7.6 5.6 4.1 28.3 18.1 12.8
3 22.1 11.5 8.5 4.5 3.3 2.5 24.8 14.2 10.7
4 16.7 7.9 4.9 7.2 3.5 1.9 22.6 12.6 7.7
5 (Richest) 12.0 4.8 2.5 4.8 2.4 0.9 17.9 8.4 4.8
Total 21.9 12.1 8.5 7.0 4.9 3.8 26.7 16.0 11.4
Weighted total head count 26.6 15.7 11.5 8.2 6.4 5.4 31.0 19.7 14.8
Overshoot
1 (Poorest) 37.6 33.8 31.4 12.9 12.0 12.0 89.9 85.5 82.4
2 11.8 9.3 7.7 7.1 7.1 6.3 21.6 18.4 16.2
3 13.8 11.5 10.1 2.3 2.3 1.8 20.7 18.0 16.2
4 5.8 4.2 1.3 2.3 2.3 1.6 10.7 8.2 6.8
5 (Richest) 2.8 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.5 10.4 8.6 7.6
Total 14.2 11.9 10.6 5.0 5.0 4.4 30.1 27.2 25.4
Weighted overshoot (Ow) 21.1 18.3 16.5 7.5 7.2 6.2 42.0 38.6 36.3
Concentration index, C_E −0.214 −0.300 −0.352 −0.163 −0.311 −0.451 −0.162 −0.233 −0.293
Concentration Index, C_O −0.487 −0.535 −0.567 −0.495 −0.552 0.585 −0.491 −0.525 −0.546
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Poverty headcount 54.9 57.6
Poverty gap 3,937 4952
Normalized poverty gap 26.1 32.8
Normalized mean positive poverty
gap
47.5 57.0
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hospital admissions, reflecting the expensive nature of
these services. Higher levels of self reported illnesses
among the richest population confirm findings reported
elsewhere that the poor are more likely to ‘ignore’ ill-
nesses because they cannot afford to seek treatment or
to take time off work [27].
Kenyans bear a large burden of OOP payments. Each
year, Kenyan households spend close to a tenth of their
budget on health care payments. The high levels of OOP
payments reflect the health financing system in Kenya,
which relies heavily on user fees at the point of service
delivery. This financing mechanism does not allow for
prepayment, risk pooling and cross-subsidisation. In ab-
solute terms, the richest households spend significantly
higher amounts of money on treatment compared to the
poorest households. When OOP payments are expressed
as a percentage of consumption expenditure, findings re-
veal a regressive pattern for both outpatient and in-
patient illnesses. The poorest households spent five
times more of their budget on health care payments
compared to the richest population. Poor-rich differ-
ences were larger for inpatient compared to outpatient
care, indicating that inpatient care is unaffordable to
most poor households. High levels of spending among
the poor highlight the lack of exemption mechanisms to
protect the poor in the Kenyan health sector. The
budget share of OOP payments is significantly higher in
the urban than in the rural areas, reflecting both differ-
ences in socio-economic status and treatment seeking
patters. Urban areas have more private providers and
larger public health facilities, whose charges are signifi-
cantly higher than those locate in rural areas. These
findings confirm that OOP payments in low-income
countries are very regressive as documented in other set-
tings [4,28,29], and highlight the urgent need to protect
the poor from high costs of illness.
About 16% and 5% of households incurred health ex-
penditure that exceeded 10% and 40% of total household
budget respectively. A larger proportion of households
incurred catastrophic payments due to outpatient ser-
vices compared to inpatient care. About 11% ofhouseholds spent over 10% of their budget on outpatient
treatment, compared to 4.2% for inpatient care. The in-
cidence of catastrophic expenditure at corresponding
thresholds is much higher when OOP payments are
expressed as a proportion of non-food budget. This in-
crease reflects the greater share of resources spent of
food items in Kenya, which is typical of spending pat-
terns in low-income countries. For total OOP payments,
5.6% of households reported payments greater than 40%
of total expenditure; this proportion doubled, when the
threshold was set relative to share of non-food expend-
iture. Xu et al. estimated catastrophic spending among
Kenyan households using data from a similar survey
conducted in 2003 [30]. They found that overall 4.1 per
cent of households faced catastrophic health expend-
iture. About 5.8% and 6.1% of households incurred
health care costs over 40% of non-food budget for out-
patient and inpatient services respectively. While it is
not always possible to directly compare findings due to
methodological differences, results presented in this
paper suggest that the burden of OOP payments for in-
patient care might be decreasing, while that of out-
patient care is on the increase. This downward trend in
the proportion of households facing catastrophic costs
due to inpatient care should be interpreted with caution.
It is known that inpatient care is much more expensive
than outpatient and it is possible that households might
have failed to seek admission due to affordability barriers
(particularly the poor). Also, there is a tendency to over-
estimate annual spending on OOP payments when
health costs are scaled to annual estimates. The timing
of household surveys also has important implications for
levels of self reported illness, treatment seeking patterns
and cost burdens [5,27].
Kenya has a mandatory national hospital insurance
fund (NHIF) for those working in the formal sector. In-
formal sector workers can join the NHIF on a voluntary
basis. NHIF only caters for costs associated with in-
patient care and members have to pay for outpatient ser-
vices through OOP payments. These findings show that
that outpatient care can be expensive and highlight the
need to include outpatient benefit packages in the NHIF
and other existing prepayment arrangements like com-
munity based health insurance. Importantly they high-
light the urgent need for Kenya to move towards
progressive financing mechanisms that offer financial
risk protection for the poor.
The poverty head count accounting for OOP payments
was 54.9%. These findings compare closely with those by
the World Bank and the Kenya National Bureau of statis-
tics [19,31]. About half 1.48 million Kenyans are pushed
below the national poverty line due to OOP payments.
The increase in the poverty gap following the change in
the poverty line was not only due to individuals falling
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falling further below the poverty line once health care
payments were subtracted from total consumption ex-
penditure. This shows that OOP payments are a major
barrier of development since push non-poor households
and trap those who are already poor in it. The role of
OOP payments in household poverty has been recog-
nized by many authors [4,15,32]. In Asia, for example,
the poverty head count increased by 14% after account-
ing for health care payments. An additional 2.7% of the
population had income that was less than the inter-
national poverty line of US$ 1 per day after they paid for
health care [26]. Increases were highest in countries that
rely heavily on OOP payments as the source of health
care funding. These levels are relatively high compared
to those reported in this study since the majority of study
households were already living in poverty before incur-
ring health care payments. Caution should be taken when
interpreting these results for policy. For example, provid-
ing financial risk protection for all Kenyans would con-
tribute towards poverty reduction. However, it is unlikely
that the impact of these policies will be proportionate to
the proportion of individuals impoverished by health care
costs as estimated in this paper.
Limitations
The findings of this study should be interpreted in the
context of some limitations. First, data presented are
from a cross-sectional household survey. Longitudinal
approaches are most suited to capture impacts OOP
payments on household living standards. It is however
difficult to study a large number of households longitu-
dinally and national representative data that are available
are only from cross-sectional surveys. Secondly, the ap-
proach assumes that costs are spread evenly over a year.
Households might experience peak costs in one month
which might have significant implications on their bud-
gets [14]. Thirdly, it has been shown that lost earnings
are sometimes more catastrophic than actual payment
[6]. Fourthly, estimates of catastrophic health expend-
iture do not capture individuals who do not seek care
due to various barriers. Failing to capture the poorest of
the poor could lead to underestimation of the incidence
and intensity of catastrophic payments and impoverish-
ment. Finally, poverty levels in Kenya differ between
rural and urban areas. It is possible that the majority of
households pushed and trapped into poverty due to
OOP payments are mainly from rural areas. Regardless
of these limitations, important policy lessons can be
drawn from the findings presented in this paper.
Conclusions
It is very clear that the burden of OOP payments is high,
Kenyans are becoming poor and many more are beingtrapped into poverty due to health care payments. The
Kenyan government should urgently consider alternative
health financing mechanisms that offer financial risk
protection to the population. Such approaches, as clearly
stated in the WHO 2010 report should encourage risk
pooling and income cross-subsidization [33]. Discus-
sions on how best to offer financial risk protection to
Kenyans have ongoing for close to a decade now. The
results presented in this paper show the urgent need for
Kenya to move beyond discussions and implement
reforms that will protect the population from health care
related impoverishment.
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